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1. Introduction
Software
licensing is the third largest industry in the United
States.[1]
Most leading software companies are incorporated in the
United States, Japan, and European countries.[2]
However, since 65% of
practicing U.S. attorneys do not address the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,[3] or other international norms,
it may surprise many U.S. counsel that a standard
U.S. software licensing contract will often violate
European consumer law, generate bad publicity and result
in fines. AOL France learned the hard way in 2004, when a
French court invalidated nearly every clause in its
standard subscriber contract,[4]
even though AOL had localized and revised the agreement to
suit the local market in response to requests from a
consumer protection agency. The court awarded ?30,000
in damages, levied a fine of ?1,000 for each day the
invalidated clauses remained on AOL?s website, and
ordered substantive parts of the court?s decision be
published on the AOL?s website and three national daily
newspapers. The reviewing court affirmed on all
counts.[5]
The
experience of AOL in France demonstrates a large
discrepancy between the U.S. and EU online consumer
agreements. U.S. courts have routinely enforced many
agreements similar to AOL France?s, even with terms less
favorable to consumers.[6]
As
the software industry increasingly goes global, corporate
counsel must not only stay on top of foreign regulatory
developments but be comfortable working in a wide variety
of legal traditions as well. Software
licensors need to determine whether they can realize their
investment and protect their source code in high piracy
countries, especially those with a high rate of
technological literacy.[7]
While developing countries currently play a relatively
minor role in the global software industry, China, Russia,
and Brazil are showing rapid progress.[8]
Due to rapidly growing software markets of China, Russia,
and India, the worldwide software theft losses exceeded
the $50 billion mark. Leading software makers estimate the
2009 rate of global software piracy at 43%, with Georgia
and Zimbabwe topping the charts with a piracy rate
exceeding 90%, and the United States showing the lowest
worldwide rate of 20%.[9]
Approximately 50% to 90% of software available on auction
websites such as eBay is pirated.[10] U.S.
counsel needs to gain familiarity with various foreign
intellectual property protection regimes because software
licensing laws are generally not extraterritorial.[11]
Nevertheless, a number of high piracy countries agree to
enforce U.S. intellectual property rights as a condition
of joining into trade alliances. For example, a signatory
country of the Berne Convention must grant
the same protection to intellectual property rights of
citizens of other signatory states as it grants to its
own nationals. Prior to the Berne Convention,
nationals of their respective countries had no formal
copyright protection abroad. The Berne Convention
signatories went on to create the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), which currently consists of
184 Member States and is now an agency of the United
Nations devoted to developing an international
intellectual property system.[12]
Under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS), developing countries must accept minimum
intellectual property rights in exchange for access to
lucrative markets. A
typical U.S.-style contract, based on principles of free
market economy, will be viewed as one-sided and
unconscionable in Europe and Japan, where lawmakers place
more emphasis on providing consumers with a social safety
net.[13]
A software licensor cannot freely require licensees in
those major markets to arbitrate away from home, waive
basic consumer rights, reverse engineering rights, choice
of law, or cooling off periods for distance contracts.
This paper analyses some of the most significant points of
tension in software licensing law between the U.S. and the
next two biggest software markets - EU and Japan. Practice
pointers at the end will help U.S. counsel to avoid costly
mistakes and bad publicity by effectively localizing
contract terms and business strategies to account for
differences in law and culture. 2. European
Consumer Protection
The
considerable differences in contract law in the U.S. and
EU reflect different perceptions about the role of
government in regulating markets. The U.S. has
traditionally been skeptical about government regulation
while placing more emphasis on market-driven institutional
arrangements.[14]
Digital
consumer legislation has not had great success in the
U.S.[15]
The most famous pro-consumer legislation proposed in the
recent time, the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act
(DMCRA), [16] has
been introduced into Congress three times without
success. [17] On
the contrary,
as evidenced by the number of recent major consumer
protection laws and initiatives in Europe, EU legislators
have not been so eager to let the market forces play a
greater role in business-consumer relations. [18]
A
gap in attitudes about the risks of free enterprise leads
EU legislators to believe that consumers will tend to
avoid weakly regulated markets. Therefore, high minimum
levels of consumer protection are necessary to create new
distribution channels.[19]
U.S. counsel must be aware that, while EU Directives
mandate the minimum levels of protection, Member States
can grant higher levels to its consumers. The
EU differs from the U.S. not just in substantive law but
in methods of enforcement. U.S. software licensors
frequently include arbitration or choice of forum clauses
in order to avoid litigation in remote forums. It may be
difficult, however, to limit European consumer?s right of
redress locally because license terms limiting that right
are invalidated as unfair. [20]
In the UK, for example, an arbitration clause relating to
amount of GBP�5,000
or less is automatically unfair as a matter of law.[21] Nevertheless, regulatory
agencies play a significantly greater role than courts
in enforcing consumer protection laws in Europe.[22] Counsel to a U.S. software
licensor must keep this strong pro-consumer stance in
mind when drafting a license agreement for European
markets. a. Unfair
Contract Terms Directive
The
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts[23]
exhibits some of the most significant differences between
EU and U.S. consumer contract law. The Directive applies
to non-negotiated contracts between a business and a
consumer. Software contract terms classified as unfair
under the Directive are not binding on consumers. A
non-negotiated contractual term is regarded unfair if,
?contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a
significant imbalance in the parties' rights and
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment
of the consumer.?[24] An
Annex to the Directive contains a non-exclusive list of
presumptively unfair terms. The list presumptively
invalidates many terms typically present in U.S.
software contracts: mandatory arbitration clauses,
disclaimers of warranties, limitation of licensor?s
liability, contract assignment, limitation of consumer?s
remedies, automatic contract extension, binding
the consumer to terms without providing a real opportunity
of becoming acquainted with the terms, unilateral
modifications of contract or any characteristics of the
product or service.[25] U.S.
counsel must not only avoid incorporating terms from the
Annex list of suspect terms into licensing agreement but
keep in mind that even if a particular term is not on the
list, European interpretation of contractual fairness is
likely to favor a consumer to a significantly greater
degree than it would in U.S. courts. When a contested term
is not on the list of suspect terms, the Directive
mandates courts to apply a more broad fairness test. Any
contractual term causing a ?significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations arising under the
contract, to the detriment of the consumer? is deemed
unfair under the Directive.[26]
Ambiguities will be interpreted in light ?most favourable
to the consumer.?[27]
b. The
Distance Selling Directive
The
Distance Selling Directive[28]
gives European consumers that purchased goods through
distance communication the same rights as if they had
purchased those goods in person. Most notably, the
Directive grants consumers
a nonwaivable seven day minimum ?cooling off? period in
which to withdraw from the contract without penalty and
without giving any reason. Member States can enact
legislation that provides for longer cooling off
periods. The only charge that may be made to the
consumer because of the exercise of this right of
withdrawal is the direct cost of returning the goods.[29]
This provision does not apply to software ?unsealed by the
consumer,?[30]
which means that the withdrawal provision doesn?t apply to
clickwrap agreements, where the consumer downloads
software from the Internet. Even though auction sales are
specifically exempt from the Directive,[31]
a German court applied the Directive to an eBay auction,
ruling that consumers had 14 days to return the
merchandise under German law.[32]
U.S. counsel must be cognizant that, while all European
consumers have a seven-day minimum cooling off period,
this period may be extended by the operation of national
law of a Member State. 3. IP
Protection for Software in Japan
Japan
is a civil law country and its courts are not bound by stare decisis.[33]
Due to a firmly rooted sense of wa, civil
harmony,
Japan has about one-twentieth per capita amount of
litigation than U.S.[34]
The centrally controlled court system allows the Supreme
Court to impose its legal positions upon lower courts.[35]
Therefore, the judiciary might not always be the most
effective way to resolve disputes on established matters
of law, and arbitration can have advantages in those
cases. The
IP protection of software became an important issue in the
1970s, when mass produced software was introduced for the
market of personal computers.[36]
In
1972, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) Study Committee on Legal Protection of
Software issued
a report on the state of protection of computer software
and proposed certain legislative
amendments. Most notably, the study concluded that
software products were entitled to copyright protection,
and such protection was inadequate at the time.[37] The report proposed to amend
the then existing legislature to address failure to
prohibit unauthorized use, failure to discourage
duplicative development, and long-term protection under
copyright.[38]
Recommendation to use arbitration to resolve disputes
was made.[39] IP
protection problems in software were further examined by a
subcommittee within the Copyright Council that recommended
to grant the copyright owner distribution rights and to
develop a registration process to help distribution of
work and
avoid duplication of effort.[40]
In a 1982 decision by the Tokyo district court,
for the first time in Japan the court extended a copyright
protection to a computer object program.[41] In
1983, MITI proclaimed that software was an economic asset
which is fundamentally different from other copyrighted
works such as literary texts, music, or drawings.[42]
MITI proposed important principles for the legal
protection of software: recognition of the special
characteristics of software (need to maintain
confidentiality of the code and the ease of its copying),
promotion of industrial use of software, balancing rights
of new and old software, protection of economic rights of
users and developers, flexibility to adapt to rapid
changes, and recognition of the international nature of
the legal protection of computer software.[43] MITI adopted a sui
generis approach to the protection of computer
software and proposed enacting the Program Rights Law (Puroguramukenho)
which would protect software for fifteen years, include
right of use and compulsory licensing but there were no
moral rights protections for the creators under the Berne
Convention.[44] In
response, the Copyright Council recommended that Japan
follow the worldwide trend of using copyright law as the
primary vehicle for the protection of computer software.
Even though MITI was more powerful than the Copyright
Council, the Council?s recommendations were followed due
to the pressure from the European Economic Community (EEC)
and the U.S.[45] As a result, the
Japanese Copyright Law was amended in 1985 to define a
computer program (puroguramu) as ?an expression
of combined instructions given to a computer so as to
make it function and obtain a certain result,? and add program
works to the list of works of authorship, allow
authorship to be extended to either the natural person
or the legal person with the natural person receiving
extended protection of life plus fifty years. The Law
established a registration system for computer programs
but since Japan is a signatory to the Berne Convention,
registration is not required to enjoy the protection of
copyright.[46] Overall,
commentators note that generally intellectual property
protection of software is weaker in Japan than in the U.S.
and that copyright in Japan
mostly protects just the literal expression of software
code but not so much the broader features of software
design as in the U.S.[47]
A great deal of uncertainty
comes from the lack of case law and trends to implement
provisions similar to the European Directive,[48]
such as a provision to specifically allow reverse
engineering for the purposes of achieving
interoperability. 4. Reverse
Engineering Clauses
It
is common to see clauses in U.S. software licenses that
bar the licensee from reverse engineering, disassembling,
or decompiling the software. Such clauses may be
problematic under the European and Japanese law. Reverse
engineering is a process of deducing the inner workings of
software by analyzing its structure and operation. At one extreme, this can be
done by taking the program apart with a tool such as a
disassembler that translates machine language of 1?s and
0?s into human-readable programming language. At the
other extreme is the "black box" method of feeding data
to the program and observing its behavior.[49] Legitimate
reasons for reverse engineering include software
customization, debugging, personal education, ensuring
compatibility with other software, determining whether
another company had stolen and reused the source code,
determining whether a program is capable of performing
as advertized.[50]
Illicit reverse engineering occurs when the reverser
copies the competitor?s code into own product. a. Unites
States
In the United States, limited
reverse engineering for legitimate purposes is permitted
in the context of the fair use doctrine, even if reversing
is done to discover trade secrets.[51]
In reality, however, reverse engineering of software in
the U.S. is generally illegal because most software
license agreements prohibit
it, and courts have found such prohibitions, whether in a
clickwrap or shrinkwrap form, to override the Copyright
Act which allows reversing for limited purposes.[52]
Users are considered to
have waived their limited reverse engineering rights by acceding
to the end-user license agreement with an anti-reverse
engineering clause.[53]
No court has concluded that a software license restricting
reverse engineering is preempted by federal law, although
some preeminent copyright law scholars have criticized
this judicial reluctance.[54] When ruling on the federal
preemption issue, the courts have addressed (1) the
preemption of state laws under the Copyright Act, and (2)
preemption of private contract provisions. These decisions
concluded that, while federal preemption exists, it does
not apply to private contractual relationships. In other
words, even though the Copyright Act trumps state laws,
the parties are free to waive their federal rights if they
so choose. In
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), the
Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of state law
preemption by the Copyright Act. Louisiana License Act
permitted software producers to prohibit the
decompilation or disassembly of its licensed software.
However, �117 of the Copyright Act allows the owner of a particular
copy of a copyrighted computer program to make copies or
adaptations of the program for reasons such as essential
steps in utilization of the program, backup copies, etc.
The License Act authorized a perpetual bar on copying,
whereas the Copyright Act granted protections for the life
of the author plus fifty years. The
License Act placed no restrictions on programs which may
be protected, yet under the Copyright Act, only
?original works of authorship? can be protected.
Therefore, since the Congress had spoken directly on
point, the Louisiana Act was preempted by the Copyright
Act and portions of the license agreement which
contradicted it were held to be unenforceable. In
evaluating whether private parties can waive their
federal rights to reverse engineer software, the courts
balance freedom of contract with federal policies.
Contractual waivers of an individual's state and federal
statutory rights are enforced if
the waiver is ?clear and umistakable? and ?it waives a
statutory right designed to protect the interests of
individual parties rather than the public.?[55] When the courts specifically
addressed the validity of waiver of federal right to
reverse engineer software under the Copyright Act they
held such waivers valid even within the terms of a
shrinkwrap license.[56]
For
example, the
Federal Circuit in Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc., 320
F.3d 1317 (Fed.Cir. 2003), plaintiff
Bowers
sold his software program with a shrinkwrap license
containing an express prohibition on reverse
engineering. Nevertheless,
defendant Baystate reverse engineered the software. In a
breach of contract action, Baystate argued that the
Copyright Act preempted the prohibition of reverse
engineering embodied in the shrink-wrap license
agreements. The court held that the Copyright Act
did not preempt Plaintiff's contract
claims and drew a distinction between
preemption as applied to state laws versus private
contracts: ?while the Fifth Circuit has held a state law
prohibiting all copying of a computer program is preempted
by the federal Copyright Act, no evidence suggests the
First Circuit would extend this concept to include private
contractual agreements supported by mutual assent and
consideration.?[57] In
sum, while the courts do not allow states to enact laws
that violate the Copyright Act, private contracting
parties are free to waive their federal right to reverse
engineer software even in a non-negotiated context of a
shrinkwrap license. Since the majority of software
licenses in the U.S. prohibit reverse engineering, it is de facto illegal in most cases. b. Europe
The
E.U. Directive on Legal Protection of Computer Programs[58]
allows
reverse engineering for the purposes of and to
the extent necessary to achieve interoperability of the
licensor's software with other systems. The
Directive prohibits it for the purposes of creating a
competing product, and also prohibits the public release
of information obtained though reverse engineering of
software.[59] In contrast to the U.S., European
consumers cannot be required to contractually waive their
reverse engineering rights. A
common strategy to deal with this risk of reverse
engineering is to get licensees to agree and acknowledge
that they have sufficient information to create any
interfaces to interoperate with the licensed software,
i.e., that the licensee has sufficient interoperability
information. However, it is possible that
interoperability problems may arise after such waiver,
since only the United States, Burma, and Liberia do not
follow international system of units.[60] Furthermore, U.S.
counsel, while drafting a reverse engineering clause for
European markets, must keep in mind that in the European
Union, the right of interoperability explicitly outweighs
the freedom of contract, and courts and consumer
protection agencies have been very proactive in protecting
European consumers.[61]
U.S. licensor must also be careful not to give away any
technical information that may violate U.S. export laws,
whether it?s an actual export to a physical foreign
location or ?deemed? export where a foreign licensee
accesses the information from own computer abroad.[62] c. Japan
Even
though the
1985 amendments to the Japanese Copyright Law do not
address reverse engineering, it is not prohibited. Generally
speaking, reverse engineering to achieve interoperability
in Japan falls within the fair use doctrine. In the
mid-1990s, Japan considered
a change to the Copyright Law that would allow reverse
engineering but the proposal was defeated due to the
pressures from the U.S.[63]
Currently, the Japanese Copyright Law does not contain a
general fair use provision nor does it directly address
reverse engineering. However, the Law provides for the
balancing of the authors' rights with the benefit of the
public and technology development. Specifically,
the Law states that its purpose is ?to aim at protecting the rights
of authors, etc., while considering fair
utilization of these cultural products,
and thereby to contribute to the development of
culture.?[64] The
protections of the Copyright Law extend only to
expressions, whereas underlying ideas must be
available for public use unless they meet higher
requirements for protection under the Patent Law (such
as novelty and nonobviousness). In 1993, the
Guidelines of the Agency of Patents clarified that
protection of ideas in software depends upon patents. Since
non patented ideas must be available to public, and it
is practically impossible to study a computer program
by reading its object code of millions of 1s and 0s, a
version closer to source code is necessary. At the
same time, allowing all reverse engineering might
chill the developers and slow down technological
development which would violate art. 1 of the Japanese
Copyright Law. Disassembly and decompilation, thus,
are practical compromise to make underlying software
ideas available to public without impeding
technological development.[65]
Encouraging
inter-operability does not always harm software
developers, and may in some cases increase the
program?s market share. For example, one company?s
spell-checker that can be used with another company?s
word processor could make the word processor more
popular and increase its producer?s market share.[66] Program
developers may try to license interoperability but
this may be problematic because it would require
significant expenditures and those that disagree with
license terms may still get away with reverse
engineering software for interoperability. For
example, when Accolade wanted to develop video games
compatible with Sega?s console, it gave up on pursuing
a license, copied Sega?s copyright protected object
code and reverse engineered several Sega?s video
games. The
court held that this copying constituted fair use.[67] Reverse
engineering for purposes other than to achieve
interoperability may be impermissible in Japan.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Shuuwa System Trading KK,[68] the defendant
disassembled Microsoft?s object code and published it
in a book form with the defendant?s comments and
labels for easier understanding. Microsoft
obtained an injunction. The court ruled that
intermediate copying for the purposes of reverse
engineering was an unauthorized reproduction in
violation of the Copyright Law. There is some dispute
whether the case can be interpreted to prohibit
reverse engineering for all purposes but, most likely,
it does not go that far. The case was decided before
the amendments to the Copyright Law and, furthermore,
the defendant engaged in publication and massive
reproduction of the plaintiff?s code. The current
Copyright Law allows
making copies of computer software ?to
the extent deemed necessary for the purpose of
exploiting that work in a computer.?[69] Therefore,
it might be difficult for a U.S. licensor to enforce a
typical U.S.-style clause that prohibits reverse
engineering for interoperability purposes in Japan. 5. Quickwrap
A
quickwrap software license refers to a standard of ?take
it or leave it? non-negotiated agreements where the
licensee manifests assent by such means as opening a
plastic shrinkwrap, or clicking on a hyperlink or ?I
Agree? button.[70]
Software licensors draft quickwrap agreements to limit
their liability and protect their intellectual property
rights.[71] U.S.
courts are inclined to enforce various forms of quickwrap
agreements if the user had reasonable notice and
manifested assent to the online terms.[72]
Due to the well known reverence for the free market in the
U.S., it is not surprising that such agreements are only
held invalid when found unconscionable.[73] Unconscionablity is a difficult
standard to meet, and the doctrine is invoked in rare
instances because it requires that terms be shockingly
oppressive, not merely unreasonable, before they will be
considered unenforceable.[74] This paper focuses on two most
litigated forms of quickwrap in Europe: shrinkwrap and
clickwrap. a. Shrinkwrap
Shrinkwrap
is the earliest form of quickwrap, developed by the
software industry in the 1970?s.[75]
The name ?shrinkwrap? evolved from ?the early practice of
displaying the terms of the license through the plastic
wrapping.?[76]
The practice of stating that breaking open the plastic
packaging or loading the software onto a computer
constituted an acceptance of the stated license terms
spread through the software industry despite substantial
doubts about the enforceability of these licenses, both as
a matter of contract law and as a matter of intellectual
property policy.[77] United
States
In
order to settle this nebulous area of law, the National
Conference of Commissioners in Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(?UCITA?),
which explicitly and controversially accepted Shrink-wrap
licenses as enforceable contracts.[78]
However, in the face of mounting opposition, NCCUSL ceased
efforts to get the UCITA enacted in all states of the U.S.
Thus, UCITA has only been enacted in Maryland and
Virginia.[79]
For a long time, U.S. courts refused to enforce shrinkwrap
licenses.[80] Nevertheless,
in 1996, shrinkwrap licenses received a significant
boost from the
Seventh
Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, [81] a landmark case that soon defined
the law on shrinkwrap licenses. The defendant purchased CD-ROMs.
Printed on the box was a notice that the conditions of use
of the CD-ROMs were defined by the terms in the user's
manual inside the box. The court held that the contract
had been formed, pursuant to the general principles of
contract formation of the UCC and common law, when the
buyer ?accepted? the terms by electing to keep the
software. Since ProCD,
the U.S. courts have widely enforced shrink-wrap
licenses.[82] In
order to be enforceable, a shrinkwrap license
generally
must give notice that a program is offered subject to
terms. The most common ways of doing this are to provide
a conspicuous notice on the program box, on a sales
receipt, or otherwise prior to purchase). For example,
in I-A Equip. Co., Inc. v. ICode, Inc.,
the Massachusetts District Court held a shrinkwrap
license enforceable where the sales order gave notice of
additional terms inside the software box, the terms of
the license were printed on the outside of an envelope
containing the software, and the program required the
purchaser to explicitly accept the terms of the
agreement in order to complete installation of the
software. 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 807 (D. Mass. 2002).
Some
courts have even upheld the license where the
terms were not made available prior to a
consumer's receipt of the program but the user was
allowed an opportunity to return the program if he or
she disagrees with the license terms.
The court in Adobe Systems, Inc.
v. Stargate Software Inc.,
determined that the agreement was enforceable against
the defendant software distributor because the user had
the opportunity to return the software if it did not
agree with the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement inside
the box, and the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement
clearly indicated that the transaction was a license,
not a sale. 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Some
courts have found that notice to a purchaser that
additional terms will be required is sufficient to
enforce a shrinkwrap agreement. In Microstar v.
Formgen, Inc.,
942 F. Supp. 1312 (S.D. Cal. 1996), new ?levels? of a
software game were sold separately from the disk
containing the original game and license agreement as a
separate file, the terms of which permitted users to
create new levels of the game for personal use, but
forbade commercial redistribution of new levels.
Licensees were not required to read or accept the
license terms prior to installing the game software. The
court held that the software reseller was aware of the
terms of a license agreement, and thus, although the
manufacturer could have done a better job of making
users aware of the license, the manufacturer's
restrictions on re?use of its program were applicable to
the reseller. Due
to the general American pro-business inclination, the
courts tend invalidate shrinkwrap licenses only in
exceptional circumstances, such as unconscionable terms
or violations of a rule of a positive law. In Softman
Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal.
2001), the court held a shrinkwrap license unenforceable
because the user never installed the software and thus
never had the opportunity to view or accept the terms of
the license, which were not contained in the packaging,
but presented only when a user installed the software.
The court held that reading a notice on the outside of
the software box that indicated that the transaction was
subject to a clickwrap license contained in the media
was not sufficient to show assent to such terms. Europe
European
courts have taken a more cautious approach. In the
European Union, the issue of shrinkwraps is decided at the
Member State level. The first European shrinkwrap case was
decided in 1995 by the District Court of Amsterdam in Coss Holland B.V. v T.M. Data Nederland B.V.[83]
TM Data is an accredited Dutch retailer of Raima, a U.S.
software company. TM Data provided Coss with a defective
software program that resulted in serious losses to Coss.
Coss then filed a liability claim against TM Data. TM Data
denied liability by relying on their position as a
retailer: they could only deliver something that was
provided to them without any opportunity of quality
control. Furthermore, TM Data argued that their full
performance under the contract had been provided and
complete from the moment the software package had been
unwrapped. They contended that the shrinkwrap agreement
was between Coss and Raima, and TM Data was not a party to
the contract. The
Court rejected this argument, and held that the sale led
to the conclusion of the contract between Raima and Coss.
The Court stated that Dutch contract law requires a clear
notice of the contents of the license agreement, yet ?the
simple opening of a wrap does not, from this fact, form a
contract of license between the producer of the software
and the user.?[84]
As a result, the retailer was held liable for the damages
resulting from the defective software. Nonetheless,
shrinkwrap agreements are frequently used in the
Netherlands, although the U.S. Department of Commerce
explicitly warns that ?[m]ost shrink-wrap packaging as
used in the United States does not comply [with local
law].?[85]
Under the Dutch law, the customer must have received the
terms and conditions in hand before or at the time of
the sale, not after opening the package.[86] In
the EU countries where the issue of shrinkwrap licenses
has not yet been specifically addressed by the
legislature or courts (e.g. Germany,[87]
Sweden[88],
Finland[89]),
general contract formation principles apply. The
controlling factor is usually whether the licensee has
had a meaningful opportunity to familiarize himself or
herself with the license prior to purchase. In order to
draft enforceable licenses, U.S. counsel must seek
clarification at various local governmental agencies and
departments of commerce on the requirements. Japan
In
Japan, shwinkwrap agreements are not enforceable unless
the consumer was aware of the license terms prior to
purchasing the software.[90]
The prevailing practice is for software publishers to
print the license on the box. The courts, however, will
not enforce the license terms that are deemed one-sided or
unreasonably unfavorable to the consumer.[91]
Furthermore, Japan has enacted legislation similar to the
European Unfair Contract Terms Directive, and the unfair
terms are invalidated even if the consumer had the
opportunity to read and accede to them.[92] The
Japanese consumer contract law contains an indicative
and non-exclusive list of unfair terms.[93] The list contains terms that
are similar to the ones in the European Directive on
unfair contract terms. Any license terms inconsistent
with the mandatory provisions of the copyright law are
unenforceable even if they were individually negotiated.[94] Since Japan does not have a
federal system, thorny issues of federal preemption do
not arise as they sometimes do in the U.S. Nevertheless,
Japan has a system of mandatory rules and default rules.
A license may not violate mandatory rules that are based
on public policy. However, article
91 of the Civil Code of Japan provides contracting
parties may declare an intention that differs from laws
and ordinances that are not concerned with public
policy. If shrinkwrap agreements violate mandatory
provisions of the copyright law which is based on public
policy, such agreements will be unenforceable.
The
Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
publishes ?Interpretative Guidelines on Electronic
Commerce?[95]
with authoritative interpretation of the Japanese
intellectual property law in plain English. According to
the Guidelines, the general contract formation
principles under the Civil Code of Japan are satisfied,
and a valid shrinkwrap agreement is formed ?[i]f the
user is aware of the contents of a license agreement
before breaking the seal.?[96] b. Clickwrap
Clickwraps
are online equivalents of shrinkwraps. A clickwrap (aka
clickstream) agreement allows website visitor to manifest
assent to contractual terms by clicking ?I Agree? box
after having an opportunity to review the terms of use.
The website will not accept orders or provide access
otherwise.[97]
Commentators state that,
despite the prevalence of these types of agreements,
many people do not read the terms prior to clicking ?I
Agree.?[98] According to a recent study,
only one or two in a thousand actually read online
contracts, and their average reading time is 29 seconds
per 2277-word average contract.[99] Unites
States
In
1998, the first two cases upheld enforceability of
clickwraps without much discussion, perhaps in part due
to relatively unsympathetic parties ? an Internet
pornography spammer[100]
and an experienced lawyer who did not read the contract.[101]
Ever since then, U.S. courts overwhelmingly find that
clicking is a valid way to manifest assent.[102]
The courts maintain that ?[a]bsent a showing of fraud,
failure to read an enforceable clickwrap agreement,
as with any binding contract, will not excuse compliance
with its terms.?[103]
However, the courts have also considered doctrines of
unconscionability,[104]
violations of public policy,[105]
fairness of forum selection clauses,[106]
and federal copyright preemption.[107]
Licensees have a difficult burden to meet under these
doctrines in order to successfully challenge a clickwrap
agreement. The few successful challenges did not turn on
the issue of whether a click was sufficient to manifest
assent. Rather, these cases turned on general contract
doctrines or because of insufficient evidence of
clicking.[108] Specht
v. Netscape Communications Corp.,
306 F.3d 17, (2d Cir. 2002) in an example of a high
burden the U.S. plaintiff would have to meet in order to
successfully challenge the clickwrap agreement. In that
case, the Second Circuit held that the license was not
enforceable because the end user of the software program
was not required to view or accept the terms of a
license agreement prior to downloading the software
program from the software provider's web site, and the
notice of the license agreement was situated below the
bottom of the screen on the download page. Therefore,
despite their controversial nature and criticisms,
clickwrap agreements continue to enjoy strong support of
the U.S. courts as long as licensee had reasonable
notice of the terms. Europe
European
courts have adopted different approaches that reflect a
continued commitment to strong regulatory oversight of
Internet consumer markets. Even if the licensee had
reasonable notice and acceded to the terms of a
clickwrap agreement, European courts are more likely to
invalidate clauses considered abusive and suspect under
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and European
consumer law.[109]
An
illustrative case arose in a small town in Southern
Italy. The plaintiff company purchased a computer over
the Internet by clicking acknowledgment to a clickwrap
agreement that turned out to contain an inconvenient for
the plaintiff choice of forum clause. Italian Civil Code
requires a buyer to double sign a contract with abusive
clauses. An Internet user fulfills this requirement by a
digital signature or a double click ? the first click to
approve contractual regulation, and the second click to
assent to abusive terms.[110]
Some commentators maintain that double click is
insufficient for a software licensor to demonstrate
compliance with the double signature provision for
potentially abusive terms. As a result, Italian
companies lack confidence in online contracting, and
local software industry practice is to confirm double
click with a follow-up hard copy of the agreement sent
to the licensee.[111]
Italy?s double signature requirement also invalidates
shrinkwrap licenses since the licensee is not able to
double sign a shrinkwrap agreement. To circumvent this,
Italian software licensors require buyers to double sign
and mail a request for warranties.[112]
While
not all European countries are as strict as Italy when
it comes to clickwrap agreements, such agreements still
require a higher level of affirmative action on the part
of consumer in other EU countries as well. Even then, if
the license agreement includes terms unfavorable to
consumers, judges invalidate the agreement entirely or
partially, pursuant to the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive. The
EU approach to clickwraps and other issued discussed
reflects a continued commitment to strong regulatory
oversight of Internet consumer markets. U.S.
software licensor that wishes to stay on the safe side
is advised to follow Italian approach, if practicable.
An ounce of prevention may very well be worth a pound of
cure. This is why, in the aftermath of the AOL France
case, Dell decided to voluntarily change its terms to
make them more favorable to licensees. Dell changed the terms that limited liability for negligence to the price of
the product; terms that excluded liability for consequential loss
arising out of breach of contract; and terms that excluded liability for oral representations not
confirmed in writing.[113] 6. Practice
Pointers
In
order to remain competitive in a global software market,
simply translating a license agreement into a foreign
language and currency might not be enough. U.S. software
licensors must comply with local law, or risk costly and
embarrassing consequences. a. Checklist:
This
list provides the list of terms and clauses that have been
routinely upheld by the American courts but might present
significant risk in the European and Japanese markets: - Ensure
that the license agreement does not include presumptively
unfair terms from the Annex to the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive. - Remove
clauses that limit licensee?s seven day minimum ?cooling
off? period of the Distance Selling Directive. - Does
the agreement require consumer to arbitrate or limit court
remedies? - Does
the license to Europe violate the consumers? right to
litigate in their local court? - Is
reverse engineering to achieve interoperability
prohibited? - Ensure
that the agreement does not contain any of the following
potentially illegal clauses from the AOL
France case: o Contract
acceptance by performance (use of Web site) o Cross-border
transfer of personal data without consumer consent o Connection
fees o Per-minute
billing o Disclaimers
of liability for negligence, service interruptions, or
service performance o Company
rights of termination o Company
right to modify contract terms after the contract
formation o Unilateral
changes to late payment rules o License
of customer?s content to the
company - Are
the terms of the shrinkwrap agreement printed
conspicuously on the box? - Does
the shrinkwrap disclose that the software is being
licensed, not sold? - Does
the licensee have the opportunity to review the full terms
of the shrinkwrap license prior to purchasing, by visiting
a website, a vendor or otherwise? - Does
the clickwrap license instruct the user to read the terms
carefully prior to acceding? - Does
the clickwrap give notice to the licensee that she may
return the software for a refund if she declines to
download or to click ?I accept? button? b. Recommendations:
In
view of the issues discussed, some possible
recommendations for software companies localizing license
agreements in Europe are:
7. Conclusion
Simply
translating a U.S. license agreement into a foreign
language might not be enough to avoid costly litigation
and negative publicity in Europe and Japan, where a
typical U.S.-style contract will be viewed as one-sided
and unconscionable. A software producer cannot deprive
licensees in those major markets of their rights to
resolve disputes close to home, to reverse engineer
software for interoperability purposes, and to enjoy a
cooling off period. A
properly localized licensing agreement must account for
differences in law, culture, and attitudes towards the
business-consumer relationships. European
countries place more emphasis on providing their
citizens with a social safety net, which results in the
high minimum levels of consumer protection.
In Japan, the software is primarily protected through
the copyright principles, in addition to patent system
and other methods of protection. A U.S. licensor must
be aware of the Japanese aversion to litigation and
high reverence for civil harmony. Individual solutions
must be tailored to account for each country?s
cultural and legal differences. [1] Michael
L. Rustad, Vittoria Maria Onufrio, The
Exportability of the Principles of Software: Lost
in Translation? 2 Hastings
Sci.
& Tech. L.J. 25, 25 (2010). [2] Balder
Verberne, Global Software Top 100 Edition: The
Highlights, Software
Top 100, 29 Sept. 2010, http://www.softwaretop100.org/global-software-top-100-edition-2010-the-highlights. [3]
Peter L.
Fitzgerald, The International
Contracting Practices Survey Project: An Empirical
Study of the Value and Utility of the United
Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts to
Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the
United States, 27
J.L.
& Com. 1, 16 (2008). [4] Bradley
Joslove, Andrei V. Krylov, Standard
American Business to Consumer Terms
and
Conditions in the EU,
Michigan
International Lawyer, Volume XVIII, No. 2,
Spring 2005, available at
http://www.michbar.org/international/pdfs/spring05.pdf [5] David
Naylor, Cyril Ritter, French Judgment
Condemning AOL Illustrates EU Consumer Protection
Issues Facing U.S. Businesses Operating in Europe,
1 N.Y.U.
J. L. & Bus. 881 (2005). [6] Jane K. Winn
& Mark Webber, The Impact of EU
Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S.
Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 Bus. Law.
209, 225 (2006). [7] Douglas
Lippoldt, Intellectual Property Reform in
Developing Countries: Trade and Investment
Dimensions, in The
Global Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights,
Chapter 13 (Robert C. Bird &
Subhash C. Jain eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008). [8] Balder
Verberne, Global Software Top 100 Edition: The
Highlights, Software
Top 100, 29 Sept. 2010, http://www.softwaretop100.org/global-software-top-100-edition-2010-the-highlights. [9] Bus. Software
Alliance, The
2009
BSA/IDC Global Software Piracy Study, available
at
http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/studies/09%20Piracy_In%20Brief_A4_111010.pdf [10] Bus. Software
Alliance, Online Software Scams: A Threat To Your
Security (Oct. 2008), at 9, http://www.bsa.org/country/Research%20and%20Statistics/~/media/A5A2B562DB8A4177A25718E6EA9C397D.ashx [11] Douglas
Lippoldt, Intellectual Property Reform in
Developing Countries: Trade and Investment
Dimensions, in The Global
Challenge of Intellectual Property Rights, Chapter 13 (Robert C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain
eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008). [12] For a brief
history of WIPO and a list of its treaties see
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO
Treaties - General Information, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/ [13] Id. [14] Jane K. Winn & Brian H.
Bix, Diverging
Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S.
and EU, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev.
175, 183 (2006). [15] Nicola
Lucchi, Countering the Unfair Play of DRM
Technologies, 16 Tex.
Intell.
Prop. L.J. 91, 105 (2007). [16] H.R.
5544, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); H.R. 107, 108th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005). [17] Steve
P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The
Dangers of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
Much Ado About Nothing? 50 Wm
and Mary L. Rev. 349, 383 (2008). [18] For a
description of recent consumer protection
initiatives in the EU see the Directorate General
for Health and Consumer Affairs website at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/press_rel/press_rel_cons_consumers.cfm [19] Winn &
Bix, supra note 14, at 184. [20] See
Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J.
Friel, Consumer Arbitration in
the European Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. Int'l L.
& Com. Reg. 357 (2002). [21] Section
91 of the Arbitration Act of 1996, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/section/91; Unfair Arbitration
Agreements (Specified Amount) Order 1999, available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/2167/pdfs/uksi_19992167_en.pdf. [22] Winn &
Webber, supra note 6, at
213. 23] Council Directive 93/13/EEC 1993 O.J. (L95) 29-34 (EC), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Directive&an_doc=1993&nu_doc=13 [24] Id.
at art. 3(1). [25] Id.
at Annex. [26] Id.
at art. 3(1). [27] Id.
at art. 5. [28] Council
Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 OJ (L144) 19-27 (EC),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997L0007:EN:NOT [29] Id.
at art. 6(1). [30] Id.
at art. 6(3). [31] Id.
at art. 3(1). [32] E.U.
Right
to Revoke Distance Purchase Extends to Commercial
eBay Auctions, in Pike & Fischer Internet
Law & Regulation (Nov. 11, 2004). [33] Wean
Khing Wong, Protecting American
Software in Japan, 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 111,
115 (Spring 1988). [34] Anthony
Lawrence Clapes, Softwars: The Legal Battles for
Control of the Global Software Industry 173 (1993). [35] Id. [36] Jack
M. Haynes, Computer Software:
Intellectual property Protection in the United
States and Japan, 13 J.
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 245,
260 (1995). [37] Torhu
Nakajima, Legal Protection of
Computer Programs in Japan: The Conflict Between
Economic and Artistic Goals, 27 Colum.
J. Transnat?l L. 143,
144-45 (1988). [38] Id. at
144. [39] Id. at
145 (footnote 13-14). [40] Teruo
Doi, Computer Technology and
Copyright-A Review of Legislative and Judicial
Developments in Japan, 8 MICH.
Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 3, 10 (1987). [41] Id.
at 10. [42] Nakajima, supra
note 37, at 148. [43]
Id. [44] See Id. at 149-151. [45] Wean
Khing Wong, Protecting American
Software in Japan, 8 Computer L.J.
111, 113 (Spring
1988). [46] Doi, supra note 40, at 15. [47] Robert
P. Merges, A Comparative Look at
Property Rights and the Software Industry. The
International Computer Software Industry: A
Comparative Study of Industry Evolution and
Structure (David Mowery ed., Oxford University Press
1996), at 7. [48] Id.
at 8. [49] Cem
Kaner, Article 2B and reverse
engineering,
Uniform
Commercial Code Bulletin,
Nov. 1998, at 1. [50] J.T. Westermeier, Reverse Engineering, 984 PLI/Pat
289, 293 (2009). [51] DVD Copy
Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner,
31 Cal. 4th 864 (Cal. 2003). (holding that
reverse engineering to discover trade secrets shall
not be considered improper means). [52] Davidson
& Associates, Inc. v. Jung,
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). [53] See Id. [54] William
Sloan
Coats and Susanna Chenette, Contractual
Provisions Prohibiting the Reverse Engineering of
Software: Permissible or Preempted? Future
Considerations for the Shrinkwrap License, 984
PLI/Pat 315, 317 (2009). [55] Christina
Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of
Contracts, 67 Md.
L. Rev. 616, 643 (2008). [56] ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). [57] Bowers,
320 F.3d, at 1325. [58] Council Directive 2009/24/EC, 2009
O.J. (L111) 16 (EC) available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0024:EN:NOT [59] Id.
at art. 6. [60] Know
Your
Jurisdiction: Practice Pointer by Anne Buckingham,
LL.M. in Software Licensing:
Principles
and Practical Strategies,
at Chapter 13 (Oxford Univ.
Pr., 2010). [61] Celine
M. Guillou, The Reverse Engineering of
Computer Software in Europe and the United States:
A Comparative Approach, 22 Colum.-VLA
J.L. & Arts 533, 541 (1998). [62]
H. Ward Classen, A Practical Guide to Software
Licensing for Licensees and Licensors 171 (3rd ed.
2008).
[63] See T.R. Reid & Peter Behr, A
Software Fight's Blurred Battle Lines: U.S. Computer
Companies Are on Both Sides as Japan Considers
Copyright Law Changes, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1994, at
D1. [64] Japanese
Copyright
Law art. 1. [65] Rieko
Mashima,
Examination of the Interrelationship
among the Software Industry Structure, Keiretsu,
and Japanese Intellectual Property Protection for
Software, 33 Int'l
Law. 119, 141 (1999). [66] Id. [67]
Id.
at 142. [68] Tokyo
Dist.Ct.
Jan. 30, 1987, available at http://www.softic.or.jp/en/cases/Microsoft_v_Shuwa.html. [69] Japanese
Copyright Law art. 47bis(1). [70] Lydia Pallas
Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons
in the Night: ReformingCopyright Owner Contracting
With Copyright Misuse, 30 Ohio
N. U. L. Rev. 495, 502 (2004). [71] See Andre
R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution,
E-Commerce and Other Computer Related Issues:
Current Developments in Liability On-line,
Business Methods Patents and Software
Distribution, Licensing and Copyright Protection
Questions,
SR040 ALI-ABA 547 (2010). [72] Rustad, supra
note 1, at 295. [73] See
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The
Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property
Law, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L. J. 827 (1998). [74] See
Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The
Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 Calif.
L. Rev. 111, n.181. (1999). [75] Rustad, supra
note 68, at 295. [76] Peerless
Wall
& Window Coverings, Inc. v Syncronics, Inc.,
85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (W.D. Pa. 2000). [77] For a
discussion of the early uses and practices in
licensing, see J. Thomas Warlick, IV, A
Wolf in Sheep?s Clothing? Information Licensing and
De Facto Copyright Legislation in UCC 2B, 45 J. Corp. Soc?y 158,
161-162 (1997). [78] Unif. Computer Information Transactions
Act � 209 (2002). [79] Maryla
Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights
Management in the United States and Europe, 52
Am. J. Comp. L. 323, n. 92 (2004). [80] Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98-100 (3rd Cir.
1991); Arizona Retail
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759, 764-766 (D. Ariz. 1993) [81]
ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). [82] For
an extensive analysis of the existing case law, see Kevin
Grierson, Enforceability of
?Clickwrap? or ?Shrinkwrap? Agreements Common in
Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet
Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5TH 309
(2003). [83] Rb Amsterdam
(tussenvonnis), Coss Holland B.V. v T.M.
Data Nederland B.V., 24 May 1995, C.R.
1997, Issue 2. [84] Clarisse
Girot, User
Protection in IT Contracts: A Comparative Study of
the Protection 295 (Kluwer Law
International 2001). [85] Office
of Technology and Electronic Commerce (OTEC), U.S.
Department of Commerce,The Netherlands: Customs,
Taxes and Documentation Requirements for IT Products
and Service Imports, http://web.ita.doc.gov/ITI/itiHome.nsf/9b2cb14bda00318585256cc40068ca69/a9d21573690aee3085256d33006f726c?OpenDocument
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). [86] Id. [87]
Marco
Ardizzon,
German Tax and Business Law 11,029
(Sweet
& Maxwell 2005).
[88] Office
of Technology and Electronic Commerce (OTEC), U.S.
Department of Commerce, Sweden: Customs, Taxes and
Documentation Requirements for IT Products and
Service Imports http://web.ita.doc.gov/ITI/itiHome.nsf/9b2cb14bda00318585256cc40068ca69/cd960e6d2ebf9d1a85256d3600511971?OpenDocument
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). [89] Office
of Technology and Electronic Commerce (OTEC), U.S.
Department of Commerce, Finland: Customs, Taxes and
Documentation Requirements for IT Products and
Service Imports http://web.ita.doc.gov/ITI/itiHome.nsf/9b2cb14bda00318585256cc40068ca69/56bc9776120547d685256d360063ab14?OpenDocument
(last visited Dec. 17, 2010). [90] Tsuneo
Matsumoto,
Article 2B and Mass Market License
Contracts: A Japanese Perspective, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1283, 1284 (1998). [91] Id.
at 1285. [92] Rustad, supra
note 68, at 740. [93] Tsuneo
Matsumoto,
Article 2B and Mass Market License
Contracts: A Japanese Perspective, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1283, 1285 (1998). [94] Id.
at 1286. [95] Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, Interpretative
Guidelines on Electronic Commerce (Feb. 2006), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/data/IT-policy/pdf/interpretative_guidelines_on_ec060526.pdf. [96] Id.
at 91. [97] Rustad, supra
note 1, at 323, 324. [98] See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting,
57 Rutgers
L. Rev. 1307, n.30 (2005). [99] Testimony of
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler Before the United States
Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Technology,
Hearing on Aggressive Sales Techniques on
the Internet and Their Impact on American Consumers
(Nov. 19, 2009). [100] Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc.,
C-98 JW PVT ENE, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 16, 1998) [101] Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., PC
97-0331, 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27,
1998) [102] Nathan
J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial
Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 577, 579 (2007). [103] Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp.
2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007). [104] Bragg
v
Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D.
Pa. 2007). [105] See
Siedle v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F.
Supp. 2d 1140, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (considering and rejecting
public policy argument). [106] Siebert v.
Amateur Athletic Union of the U.S., Inc., 422
F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1046 (D. Minn. 2006). [107] Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive
Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D.
Tex. 2006), reh'g denied, Mar. 13, 2006. [108]
Davis, supra
note 102, at 582. [109] Rustad, supra
note 1, at 732. [110] Giacomo
Parmigiani and Federica Bocci, Benchmarking of
existing national legal e-business practices 12
(2006), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/ict/files/italy_en.pdf
[111] Rustad, supra
note 1, at 734. [112] Id. [113] See
Press Release, Office of Fair Trading (U.K.), Dell
to improve terms and conditions for consumers
(July 6, 2006), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2006/111-06. This
article by San Diego Business Attorney
Sergei Tokmakov is for general educational
purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice
because your specific case may be different. Readers
should seek qualified counsel for assistance. This
article may be reprinted, provided that all credit
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